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Is an Explicit Tax Election
the Solution to the Debt/
Equity Classiﬁcation
Problem for Partnerships?
By Heather M. Field*

Heather M. Field analyzes whether a tax
election is an appropriate policy response
to the debt/equity puzzle, discusses how to
design
election
gn a debt/equity
d
q
elect o most effectively,
y,
and concludes
c ncludes byy comparing
compar ng the debt/equity
debt/equity
election to other suggested solutions.
I. Introduction

HEATHER M. FIELD is the Associate
Academic Dean & Bion Gregory Chair
in Business Law, University of California
Hastings College of the Law.
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Recent cases in the partnership context created confusion about how to determine
whether an investment is classified for tax purposes as debt or equity.1 Although
there is a long history of case law and other authorities on the debt/equity determination in the corporate context,2 the issue is more complicated in the partnership
context. This is for several reasons, including because of the fact-intensive inquiry
for determining whether a partnership exists at all,3 because the tax minimization
opportunities in partnerships (e.g., shifting income to a tax-indifferent party4 or
selling tax credits5) are very different from tax minimization opportunities in
corporations (e.g., increasing corporate-level deductions for purported interest),
and because much of the case law on the debt/equity determination focused on
equity-like purported debt in corporations but the debt/equity query in partnerships generally involves debt-like purported equity.6
Even in the corporate context, the debt/equity analysis is not easy. There is a
continuum between what we consider “pure debt” and “pure equity.” Between
these endpoints, classification requires a multi-factored, factually-intensive
analysis. And the exact factors relevant to the determination vary from circuit to
circuit and case to case.7
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Thus, in Is Debt vs. Equity Different in a Partnership?,
Steven Schneider explains, and makes proposals to solve,
the puzzle of distinguishing debt from equity in partnerships. One of his proposed solutions involves the creation
of a limited debt/equity classification election.8 This
article explores that proposed solution in greater depth.
Specifically, this article analyzes whether a tax election
is an appropriate policy response to the debt/equity
puzzle, discusses how to design a debt/equity election
most effectively, and concludes by comparing the debt/
equity election to the other possible solutions suggested
by Schneider. Ultimately, this article concludes that,
although a debt/equity classification election is worthy
of consideration, the case for a debt/equity classification
election is, at least at this time, unlikely to be sufficiently
compelling to justify the adoption of such a drastic and
broadly applicable reform.

II. Considering a Debt/Equity
Classiﬁcation Election
A debt/equity
bt/eequitty eelection could facilitate tax classification
in th
the
same
that the “check-the-box” election (the
h sa
he
ame way
w th
“CTB
election”)
CT
TB el
lectioon
on”))9 fa
facilitated
ated the proce
process of determining
te mi
whether
business
whe
etherr a bu
usineess entityy is classified
ed as a ccorporation
rporatioon
10
orr flowow-through
entity
purposes.
-thro
h ough
h en
ntit for
or tax pu
poses. There
re are
re
parallels
between
history
classifi
cation
raallelss betw
ween
n the
hee h
ry of the entity
tity cl
ssificatio
n
election and th
the evolution of the debt/equity classification analysis. This section explains those parallels. Then,
this section draws on those parallels to argue that the
adoption of a debt/equity classification election might
be appropriate and to analyze potential policy benefits
and detriments of such a change.

A. Parallels to the History
Behind the CTB Election
Before the adoption of the CTB election, entity classification depended on a multi-factored fact-intensive
“corporate resemblance” test articulated in Morrissey11
and later modified by the promulgation of the “Kintner
regulations.”12 Under the Kintner regulations, the multifactored entity classification test protected corporate
classification and made it easier for entities to obtain the
generally less desirable flow-through treatment.13 These
regulations operated successfully for quite a while, but
then the operation of the regulations faced a challenge
with the creation of LLCs, which sought to obtain the
best of both worlds—pass-through tax treatment (i.e.,
the easier status to obtain) and corporate-like liability
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protection to the entity’s owners.14 Moreover, “given the
bright line rules set forth in the Kintner regulations and
the flexibility afforded under the applicable state business statutes, practitioners were often able to create LLCs
and other business entities with a carefully tailored set of
rights and responsibilities so as to achieve tax classification as either a corporation or a partnership, as desired
by the client, while retaining significant features of the
other classification.”15 This meant that, even before the
adoption of the CTB election, entity classification was
largely elective, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly.
These circumstances ultimately led to the replacement
of this implicitly elective entity classification regime
with the explicitly elective CTB election.16
A similar story can be told with respect to the debt/
equity classification determination. Generally, the
multi-factored debt/equity test, which was developed
largely in the context of business entities taxed as corporations, protects debt classification and generally makes
it easier to obtain equity classification.17 However, just
as LLCs presented a challenge for the pre-CTB entity
classification rules, the increased use of entities taxed
as partnerships presents a challenge to the operation of
the debt/equity classification rules. This is because, with
partnerships, equity classifi
la cation (i.e., the classification
that is ge
generally
easierr tto obtain
obtain)) is often more
taxpayer
ly ea
m ta
paye
favorable,
fa able and
d hence,
henc revenue
re enue reducing.
r ducing. Indeed,
Indeed, SchneiS h
der
although
some investors
prefer
d explains
expla that,
hat alt
ho gh som
invest
may pr
debt status, equity treatment in subchapter K provides
a taxpayer with the “keys to the kingdom.”18 Moreover,
although some confusion remains about debt/equity
classification in the partnership context (hence, the
panel at the University of Chicago Law School’s 67th
Annual Federal Tax Conference and Steve Schneider’s
article), lawyers (at least in the corporate context) can
increasingly create a set of rights and responsibilities
so as to achieve reasonably certain tax classification as
either debt or equity, as desired by the client, while
retaining significant features of the other classification.19 These circumstances parallel, to a significant
extent, the circumstances that led to the CTB election,
which suggests that a debt/equity election might be an
appropriate next step.

B. Is a Debt/Equity Classiﬁcation
Election Appropriate?
An explicit tax classification election is most appropriate
when the need for classification cannot be eliminated20
and when the substance-based classification test ceases to
draw meaningful distinctions between categories.21
MARCH 2015

1. Can the Tax Differences Between Debt and
Equity Be Eliminated?
Query whether the tax consequences of debt and the
tax consequences of equity should really be so different.
If both equity and debt classification provided (or precluded) the tax benefits sought in the recent partnership
cases, then taxpayers would not have gone to such great
lengths to try to obtain their desired classification. Taxing
debt and equity alike would eliminate the importance
of the classification determination, thereby solving the
debt/equity classification puzzle raised by Schneider.
Further, unifying the tax treatment of debt and equity
would eliminate the tax bias in favor of one investment
structure or the other. Even before the debt/equity classification issue became so prominent in the partnership
tax context, numerous commentators argued for unifying
the tax treatment of debt and equity.22 The debt/equity
classification problems presented in the partnership context only add to these arguments.
Eliminating the debt/equity distinction, either in its
entirety or in the context of subchapter K, would require
fundamental
change to the tax law. This dramatic change
ameentall ch
is unlikely
soon, particularly in the curun
nlikel
lik lly to be
b forthcoming
fo
for
rent
political
environment.
need for classifi
cation
ent polit
tical envir
ron
t. Thus, the nee
ass ca
remains.
the
need too classify a financial instrument
emains.. And
d if th
he n
ns rument
ass debt
d b or equity
eqquityy remains,
rem
, there remains
remains a question
que io of
whether
should continue
heether this determination
deteermina
in
ntinue too be
b made
made
using a mult
multi-factor
test or whether an explicitly elective
if
classification election should be used instead.

2. Is There Still a Meaningful Substantive
Difference Between Debt and Equity?
Explicit elections that are used for the purpose of facilitating tax classification are most useful when the relevant
factual scenarios have become virtually indistinguishable
and the substance-based classification test ceases to be
meaningful.23 This was arguably the case with entity classification when the CTB election was adopted. Indeed,
the IRS explained that changes in state law “narrow[ed]
considerably the traditional distinctions between corporations and partnerships ... . One consequence of the
narrowing of the differences under local law between
corporations and partnerships is that taxpayers can
achieve partnership tax classification for a nonpublicly
traded organization that, in all meaningful respects, is
virtually indistinguishable from a corporation.”24 Thus,
the classification had become effectively elective, and the
purportedly substance-based classification test served
primarily to impose transaction and other costs on the
choice of entity decision.
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Thus, query whether the same is true for debt/equity
classification. Have debt and equity investments become
virtually indistinguishable? And have the factors that are
currently used to distinguish between them ceased to
have meaningful tax import? On one hand, “some commentators have argued that the traditional differences
between equity and debt have eroded over time with the
development of new theories of the firm and that ‘[t]he
recent explosion in financial contract innovation has laid
bare the deficiencies of the debt-equity distinction.’”25

Recent cases in the partnership
context created confusion about how
to determine whether an investment
is classified for tax purposes as debt
or equity.
In the middle of the debt/equity continuum, there are
financial instruments with very similar economic terms,
some of which are classified as equity and others as debt.26
On the other hand, pe
perhaps there remain fundamental
equity
should
have
tax
diffeerences
rence between
twee debt
eb and eq
uity that sh
ould h
ve ta
27
consequences,
co
quen
including
inc di g that the
he return paid oon d
debt
represents
doing
business,
whereass the return
re
esent a cost
os of d
oing busi
ss whe
et
paid on equity represents profits from doing business.28
Certainly Congress continues to police the debt/equity
line, suggesting that at least Congress continues to believe
that there are differences between debt and equity that
should continue to have meaning for tax purposes.29 The
IRS seems to agree, at least based on its number of active
debt-equity cases; as of January 2014, the “IRS Large Business and International Division [was] believed to have 300
active debt-equity cases in its inventory.”30 Additionally,
the attention that continues to be paid to classifying and
taxing hybrid instruments suggests that the tax differences
between debt and equity still matter.31
Adopting an explicitly elective approach to debt/equity
classification would be an admission of defeat—an admission that neither Congress nor the IRS can create rules that
effectively and appropriately distinguish between financial
instruments that should be taxed as debt and those that
should be taxed as equity. By adopting a debt/equity
election, the government would allow taxpayers to obtain
whichever tax classification the taxpayers desire, rather
than continuing to fight taxpayers on the debt/equity
issue. That means that, among other consequences, the
government would lose revenue as a result of tax planning
135
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similar to that in Castle Harbour and Historic Boardwalk,
but the government would also avoid the cost of litigating
these types of cases.

C. Potential Beneﬁts and Detriments
of a Debt/Equity Election
Although the case for adopting a debt/equity classification
election, thus far, may not be overwhelming, it is useful
to consider the potential benefits and detriments of such
a change. Again, parallels between the challenges of entity
classification and the challenges of debt/equity classification suggest that adoption of an elective approach for the
latter may confer policy benefits and detriments similar
to those that have been created as a result of the adoption
of an elective approach for the former.32

1. Possible Policy Upsides
to a Debt/Equity Election
Potential benefits may include simplicity, administrability,
efficiency, certainty, and fairness.
A debt/equity election would make it simpler for investors
rs and
a busi
bbusiness entities to determine with certainty
thee classifi
class
l sifi
ification
caation
i n of
o an investment. No longer
g would
lawyers
fact-intensive
awyyers be
b required
reequireed to undertake
ndertake complex,
comp
-i en
multi-factored
analyses
whether
particular
mul
lti-facctoreed an
naly to determine w
hether a p
rticular
investment
classifi
ed as debt orr equity fo
for fed
federal
nveestmeent would
w ld
d bbee cl
fied
ral
income
coome tax
t purposes.
purpoos s. An
A elective
ctive approach
app ach to debt/equity
ebt equi y
classifi
fication
ation would arguably enhance simplicity more
than the CTB election did in the entity classification

Admittedly, the debt/equity analysis
for investments in corporations is
complicated and fact-intensive,
but it is stable and reasonably wellunderstood by lawyers who can help
their clients plan.
context. This is because the current debt/equity analysis
is arguably more complex than the pre-CTB entity classification election analysis was, meaning that the benefits
of simplification may be more significant in the debt/
equity context.
The difference in complexity comes from at least three
aspects of the classification analysis. First, the debt/equity
analysis factors vary by circuit, with each circuit having
its own, slightly different, articulation of the debt/equity
136 TAXES The Tax Magazine ®

test; this means that the fact-intensive debt/equity analysis
requires a determination of which debt/equity test is applicable.33 In comparison, the pre-CTB entity classification
analysis was uniform across circuits because the Kintner
regulations articulated a set of factors that applied to all
business entities.34 Second, the number of factors relevant
to the current debt/equity analysis (up to 16, depending
on the circuit)35 exceeds the four (possibly six) factors
relevant to the pre-CTB entity classification analysis.36
Third, under the pre-CTB entity classification analysis,
the analysis was numerical; if the entity had more corporate than noncorporate features, the entity was treated as
a corporation, and otherwise, the entity was treated as a
flow-through.37 In comparison, the debt/equity classification cannot be determined merely by counting up the debt
features and comparing the number of debt-like features to
the number of equity-like features; rather, the factors are
evaluated holistically, which requires the exercise of careful,
considered professional judgment.38 Thus, because of the
complexity of the debt/equity analysis, the potential simplification benefits of an elective approach may be large,
possibly more significant than the simplification benefits
that were achieved by the adoption of the CTB election.
In addition, the move to a debt/equity classification election may be effi
fficiency eenhancing in that taxpayers would
suboptimal
terms
not need to accept
ccept possibly
ss ly subo
ptimal term
ms in oorder
der tto
obtain
ob
n the preferred
ferred tax
ax classifi
lassificcation.
tion. The CTB eelection
ec
has had th
this benefi
forr eentity
classifi
cation,39 and a d
h
enefitt fo
ntity cl
ification
debt/
equity election could similarly reduce the distortion of the
business terms of an investment that taxpayers would have
to accept in order to obtain their desired tax treatment. That
is, a debt/equity classification election could remove the tax
bias in favor of one business term or another and would
provide taxpayers with more latitude to structure financial
instruments in the way that is optimal for business purposes.
By removing the tax bias in favor of particular business
terms and by reducing the complexity of the debt/equity
classification analysis, a debt/equity classification election
could reduce transaction costs. This is because the election
would reduce the amount of work and number of hours
lawyers would need to invest in the debt/equity classification analysis and would reduce the costs imposed by the
need to restructure the business deal to obtain the preferred
treatment. Again, this parallels the cost reductions associated with the replacement of the Kintner regulations with
the CTB election.40 Of course, as is still the case post-CTB
election, taxpayers and their lawyers would still be required
to spend time analyzing which classification is preferable,
even if a debt/equity election is adopted. However, once
that analysis is completed, an elective approach makes
it much simpler to ensure that the desired classification
MARCH 2015

is achieved. The desired classification could be obtained
by filing an election form; no alterations to the terms of
the instrument would be needed in order to obtain the
desired classification.
The adoption of an elective debt/equity classification
could confer additional benefits, including an administrability benefit for the IRS (they are no longer required
to engage in complex facts and circumstances analysis in
order to do a debt/equity classification audit), a certainty
benefit (taxpayers need not rely on difficult judgment calls
in close cases), and possibly a fairness benefit (“reduc[ing]
the premium that facts and circumstances tests place on
taxpayer knowledge, sophistication, and ability to obtain
expensive advice.”).41

2. Possible Policy Downsides
to a Debt/Equity Election
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of the use of a
classification election, the CTB election has not been an
unmitigated success. There are many criticisms of the CTB
election and of elections in general that could weaken the
case for moving to an elective approach to debt/equity
classifi
cation.
fica
ation.
Some
the
simplicity
and administrability ggains deSo
ome off th
h
he sim
im
scribed
cribbed above
a e would
woould be reduced because
becau of thee need
ed for
taxpayers
thee need for
IRS
axp
payerrs to file election
eelec
forms and th
or the IR
RS
too proce
process
the
elections.
That requires
p
ess th
h ele
he
lection That
requir time aand
nd energy,
n gy,
and
significant oppo
opportunities
d all of
o thee filin
filings
lin
ng provide
pr
pro
signific
un ies ffor
or
errors. Furth
Further,
F
h a debt/equity election would be revenue
reducing; taxpayers will almost certainly make the election
that best reduces their tax costs, and given that an explicit
election removes the frictions of nontax constraints on the
tax treatment, this tax minimization opportunity would
become widely available and the revenue loss could be
significant. And, of course, giving taxpayers the opportunity to make choices about their tax treatment opens the
door for possible abuse. In the CTB context, the major
abuse concern involved foreign entities.42 With a debt/
equity election, there may be similar opportunities for tax
minimization that are considered abusive.43
The magnitude of the benefits and detriments of a debt/
equity election would vary depending on the design of the
particular election.

III. Designing a Debt/Equity
Classiﬁcation Election
Any debt/equity classification election would need to be
carefully designed so as to maximize the benefits of the
election while minimizing the risk of abuse and the costs.
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Key design features include eligibility (i.e., for which
financial instruments may the debt/equity election be
made?), default rule (i.e., what is the classification in the
absence of an election?) and technical requirements (i.e.,
what is the process for making the election?).44 Each will
be considered in turn.

A. Eligibility for the Debt/Equity Election
Eligibility for the debt/equity election is a critical question
because elections impose revenue costs. Thus, eligibility
limitations impose an important constraint on the magnitude of that revenue loss. Eligibility limitations can also
help to advance the rationale for the election by limiting
the availability of the election to those situations in which
the rationale for the election is most persuasive.45
Several eligibility questions arise in connection with a
possible debt/equity classification election. These include
whether the election should be available for investments
in both corporations and partnerships, which financial
instruments should be eligible to make the election (i.e.,
are there any instruments that are excluded and treated
as per se debt or per se equity), and directionality (i.e.,
which classification status is electable—debt, equity or
both). Each off these eligibility
considerations will be adlig
dressed
dresssed in turn.
n.

1. Corporations,
Corpo ions, Partnerships
Par nersh ps or Bo
Both?
h?
Although it was a series of subchapter K cases that led to
the University of Chicago’s recent panel on the debt/equity
distinction, the adoption of a debt/equity classification
election arguably should not be limited to investments
in partnerships only. Indeed, a key conclusion of Steve
Schneider’s article, with which I agree, is that debt is not
and should not be different in a partnership.46 Accordingly, allowing a debt/equity election for investments
in partnerships but not for investments in corporations
would be contrary to the fundamental notion that an
investment that is treated as debt in a partnership should
still be treated as debt even if the entity were to make CTB
election to be treated as a corporation for tax purposes.

2. Eligible Financial Instruments?
The debt/equity election could be limited to what
Schneider calls “Debt-Like Equity” and “Equity-Like
Debt”—i.e., the financial instruments that are nominally
classified as one thing but that have significant features of
the other.47 This would limit the election to those factual
situations that are virtually indistinguishable and that are
toward the center of the continuous array of financial
instruments between classic debt and classic equity. That
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is, by limiting the debt/equity election to the “Debt-Like
Equity” and “Equity-Like Debt” (i.e., the “hard” cases), the
election would be limited to those instruments where the
analysis is most likely to be difficult both for the taxpayer
and the IRS, where taxpayers are most likely to alter the
business deal to achieve a particular classification, and
where there is most likely to be uncertainty. That is, the
election would be limited to those instruments where
the simplicity, administrability, efficiency and certainty
benefits would likely be greatest.

As illustrated in this article, there are
no easy answers to these (and other)
election design questions.
Further, this eligibility limitation preserves the use of
the substance-based classification test for those factual
situations closer to the endpoints of the continuum where
the substance-based differences between debt and equity
remain more meaningful. This could be done either by
applying
law’s multi-factor test to financial
yingg thee current
cu
instruments
are ineligible for the election or by using
strrumeents that
th ar
a “p
“per
se”” app
approach,
used in the
per se
proacch, similar
lar to the one that is use
CTB
B election,
eleection
n,48 where
whe instruments
w
struments that
that are in
ineligible
eli ible ffor
or
the
he election
h
eelect
l tion would
w lld be
woul
b treated
t ted as “per se”
e” debt or “per
pe se”
e”
equity.
provide
moree ce
certainty
uiity
ity. Th
Thee per
p see aapproach
ppro
pr
could pr
de mo
tain y
and simplicity
plicitt for the financial instruments that are closer
to classic debt or classic equity. Providing for per se classification and avoiding actual election filings for “easy”
cases reduce transaction costs and minimize errors.
An alternative approach for classification of the instruments closer to the endpoints would be to create a safe harbor or a classification presumption for those instruments
with features that locate them closer to the endpoints of
the continuum.
The problem with limiting which financial instruments
are eligible for the election is the difficulty inherent in
identifying any particular feature(s) of financial instruments that distinguish instruments whose classifications
are clear (and thus should be treated as “per se” debt or “per
se” equity, or even “safe harbor” or “presumptive” debt or
equity) from instruments whose classifications are unclear.
This is a challenge with any classification question, but it
is arguably harder in the debt/equity context than in the
entity classification context. With entity classification,
the regulations use state law choice of entity to determine
which domestic entities are per se corporations and which
are eligible to elect; domestic entities that are incorporated
under state law are per se corporations, and other domestic
138 TAXES The Tax Magazine ®

business entities are eligible to elect.49 Incorporation is a
clear, easily determinable feature that cannot be changed
without a state filing.
Financial instruments lack an analogous feature that
could be used to separate per se debt/equity from instruments eligible to elect. Features such as a fixed maturity
date or determinable interest rate could be used for this
purpose, but those features remain a product of private
contract rather than an agreement with the state, and
hence they are more easily changed. Further, these features are more easily manipulated or obscured with the
additional of other contract terms, including options and
side agreements. There may be other features that could
be used to identify per se debt or per se equity or to identify financial instruments eligible to elect. For example,
an analogy to the Code Sec. 305 definition of “preferred
stock” or the Code Sec. 707(c) definition of guaranteed
payment could be used to define Debt-Like Equity that is
eligible to elect, and debt that would qualify for the Code
Sec. 1361(b)(5) subchapter S straight debt safe harbor
would be treated as per se debt. However, drawing many
of these lines would likely prove to be very challenging.

3. Electable Classifications and Directionality
Assuming that eligible in
instruments could be defined, query
whether
taxpayer
whe
ther a debt/equity
t/equ eelection
ct n sshould
hould allow the ta
paye
status,
only eq
equity
status, or eith
either.
to elect
ect only
on debt
ebt st
us on
ity status
r. For
investments
in
stmen in
n partnerships,
partnersh ps equity
equ y status likely
kely presents
p es
the greater opportunity for abuse, as is demonstrated
by the partnership tax cases Schneider discusses.50 This
suggests that, to minimize the risk of abuse, the election
should only enable taxpayers to elect debt status, but not
equity status, when the investment is in a partnership.
However, for investments in corporations, debt status is
often the more taxpayer-favorable status, suggesting that
the election might only enable taxpayers to elect equity
status. Thus, one possibility would be to allow different
electable debt/equity classifications for investments in
different types of entities—debt status could be elected
for investments in partnerships, and equity status could
be elected for investments in corporations. However, this
approach would violate the principle that the test for
debt should not be different in a partnership than it is in
a corporation.
A second possibility would be to allow taxpayers to
elect debt status only, regardless of whether the underlying entity is a corporation or a partnership. This would
create the same test for debt in both partnerships and
corporations. Further, at least with corporate entities, this
approach could reduce tax-created business distortions by
making it easier to obtain the often more favorable debt
MARCH 2015

treatment without potentially suboptimal changes to the
nontax business economics. However, because corporate
debt is often used to minimize the corporate level tax,
allowing taxpayers to elect into debt status regardless of
the classification of the underlying entity might open
up more opportunities corporate tax minimization. This
could be revenue reducing and could increase opportunities for abuse.
Moreover, neither of the foregoing options solves the
problem identified in Schneider’s article. The problem
raised by the partnership debt/equity classification cases
is really about equity—when should an investment in a
partnership be treated as equity? An election into debt
only provides certainty with respect to the treatment of
instruments for which the election is made, but the debt/
equity conundrum would remain with respect to the
investments in partnerships for which the election is not
made. If there is a partnership instrument for which the
election is not made, how does Culbertson apply? What
about Code Sec. 704(e)? Should an investment in a partnership for which a debt election is not made be treated
as partnership equity and be “entitled to the full set of
keys” to the subchapter
K kingdom? If so, wouldn’t that
ssub
be tantamount
taantam
mou
unt too a bi-directional election (election into
either
itheer debt
deebt orr equity),
equ
uity rather
her than uni-directional
uni-d
al election
ec
(election
elecction
n only
onlly into
intto debt)? If not, how is the investment
nvestment
classifi
purposes?
llasssifi
fied
d for
f tax p
pur
rpo
A third
possibility
would be to p
provide
d po
ossibiili y w
ide an explicit
xp cit bbii
directional
allowing taxpayers to elect to treat
nal election,
el
eligible instruments as either debt or equity. This would
open up even more opportunities for tax minimization,
and in particular, it would explicitly enable the tax minimization strategies at issue in the Castle Harbour, Historic
Boardwalk, and other recent partnership tax cases. Or said
differently, this approach would “solve” the debt/equity
conundrum in partnerships by giving up any effort to
police the debt/equity line in close cases. Moreover, this
approach would arguably override the Culbertson test for
partnerships, meaning that taxpayers might be able to elect
into partnership status when their substantive relationship
is as co-owners or lender/borrower. Ultimately, an election
into debt only fails to solve the problem in hard cases, but
adding an election into equity would, as Schneider noted,
“fraught with potential abuse.”51

B. Default Rule If a Taxpayer Does Not
Make a Debt/Equity Election
When designing an election, it is also important to specify
the tax treatment in the absence of an election.52 Alternatives for default rules include a penalty default rule (i.e.,
MARCH 2015

where the default treatment is set so as to be unfavorable
to at least one party, thereby encouraging parties to contract around the default), a preference-meeting default
rule (i.e., default treatment that generally meets parties’
expectations), a bifurcated approach (i.e., a penalty default
in certain situations, and a preference-meeting default in
others), and no default rule.53
A penalty default rule is most useful when there are
informational asymmetries between the parties and there
is a desire to create an incentive for the party with the
information to contract around the default.54 Accordingly,
a penalty default rule, either in whole or in part, would
not appropriate for a debt/equity classification election
because there is little, if any, information-forcing benefit to
be gained. Moreover, penalty defaults increase transaction
costs because they generally result in bargaining and the
filing of elections. Part of the benefit of a possible debt/
equity election is to reduce transaction costs. Thus, using
a penalty default rule for the debt/equity election would
be counterproductive.
In contrast, a preference-meeting default would give the
parties, as their default treatment, the tax treatment that
they would most likely have selected. One challenge with
this approach is determining what the preference-meeting
default would be. Ho
How
w do we know which tax treatment
the parties
p
partie would
uld most
m t likely
kely have
have selected?
It woul
would be an ov
oversimplifi
assume
implification
cat on to assu
me that invesn
tors
corporations
prefer
investorss in p
partnerto in co
ations p
refer debt and
d inves
rt
ships prefer equity. Although there are tax minimization
opportunities associated with these classifications, different
taxpayers have different preferences. Even if those assumptions provided the baselines for strong preference-meeting
default rules, they would again result in the creation of
different rules for corporations and partnerships, which
is contrary to the conclusion that the test for debt should
be the same regardless of the type of entity.
Another possibility would be to assume that the current
law provides the preference-meeting baseline. That is, a
debt/equity election could provide that, in the absence of
an explicit election, the current law determines the classification of the instrument. On one hand, this could be
conceived of as an expectation-meeting default rule for
those whose expectations are set based on the law with
which they are already familiar. On the other hand, a “current law” default rule would be tantamount to providing
no default rule; that is, the “default rule” would provide
no greater clarity or certainty than does the current law.
The benefit of this approach is that nothing changes for
taxpayers who are comfortable with the debt/equity analysis
of their instruments under current law. These taxpayers can
continue to apply current law despite the adoption of a debt/
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equity election. The only taxpayers who would be affected
are those who choose to opt out of the multi-factored debt/
equity analysis required by the current law. These taxpayers
would have the option to gain certainty and simplicity by
making an affirmative and explicit choice.
There are, however, downsides to using the current law
as the default rule. For example, taxpayers would have to
undertake the entire multi-factored analysis under the current law to know whether they want to make an election
out of this default treatment, in which case complexity
is not reduced as compared to current law. Alternatively,
a taxpayer might skip the default rule analysis and just
make an election, whether or not it is needed. This would
provide more certainty and would reduce the transaction
costs imposed by current multi-factored analysis, but this
has the potential to result in a huge number of unnecessary election filings. This would impose different, but
potentially sizable, transaction costs.
Another approach to devising a preference-meeting default rule would be to use, as a default rule, the treatment
of the instrument as determined for some nontax purpose.
For example, the debt/equity classification election default
rule could
coulld provide
prrovi that the instrument is classified for tax
purposes
urp
posess in
i the
th same
saam way that it is classified for financial
statement
to the
tateemen
nt purposes.
pu
urposses. This bears some similarity
sim
he entity
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o unlimited
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55
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Relying on a non-tax metric, such as the debt/equity
classification of the instrument for financial statement purposes, is likely to be expectation-meeting at least to some
degree. Despite the continued interest in hybrid securities,
it is generally more common for taxpayers to treat a single
instrument consistently for multiple purposes than it is for
taxpayers to intentionally create hybrid instruments that
have different treatments for different purposes. Moreover,
this approach would require taxpayers to make explicit
elections with respect to hybrid securities, thereby easily
identifying those securities for the IRS, in case the IRS
wanted to focus extra attention on hybrid securities. This
approach also likely reduces transaction costs as compared
to the “current law” default rule approach. This is because
most taxpayers, and certainly larger and more sophisticated
taxpayers with more complicated financial instruments,
will already make the financial statement determination.
Thus, this approach eliminates the need to do a separate
analysis in order to determine the default tax classification.
Further, the certainty conferred with this approach would
likely also result in many fewer “protective elections” than
would a “current law” default rule.
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C. Technical Requirements
for a Debt/Equity Election
As with any election, it would be important to specify the
basic technical requirements for making the election.56 As
Schneider notes, the most important technical requirement for a debt/equity classification election is likely
to be ensuring consistent reporting.57 This is because
the debt/equity classification of a financial instrument
affects multiple taxpayers (i.e., both the entity and the
investor), which puts the government at risk of whipsaw.
Consistent reporting could be achieved by requiring both
the entity and the investor to make the election jointly,
as with a Code Sec. 338(h)(10) election. That would be
practicable with small private investments, but requiring
joint elections could be very challenging with broader
offerings. As an alternative, the entity could make the
election, and the regulations on the debt/equity election
could provide that investors are bound by the election
made by the entity unless the investors disclose otherwise
to the IRS. Given that the entity has information reporting obligations and will generally send the investor (and
the IRS) 1099-INTs or 1099-DIVs, it is highly likely
that the entity’s debt/equity classification election will
be followed byy the investor.
inve

IV. Co
IV
Conclusion
usio
Schneider suggests a wide variety of possible solutions to
the debt/equity conundrum that is highlighted by Castle
Harbour, Historic Boardwalk, and other similar recent
partnership tax cases. Most of the solutions he suggests are
specific to subchapter K: clarifying the Code Sec. 707(a)
rules, redefining the term “partner” under Code Sec. 761,
expanding the scope of Code Sec. 707(c), using the Code
Sec. 704(b) rules to curtail the special allocations that led
to the abuses identified in the partnership debt/equity
cases, clarifying the applicability of Code Sec. 704(e), and
expanding the Code to introduce a “nonqualified preferred
partnership interest” parallel to Code Sec. 351(g). Each
of these approaches has pros and cons, but all of them
narrowly target the hardest part of the problem identified—when is debt-like purported equity treated as real
equity for purposes of subchapter K?
The debt/equity puzzle in subchapter K led us to think
more broadly about the debt/equity analysis throughout
the Code and spurred us to consider tackling the larger
debt/equity analysis with a broadly applicable solution.
Often, fundamental reform that responds coherently to
multiple related problems is better than tiny ad hoc reforms
that respond to specific, narrowly defined problems. But in
MARCH 2015

this case, the tailored solution is likely better. A subchapter
K-based solution can respond to the narrow problem of
identifying equity in subchapter K.
Admittedly, the debt/equity analysis for investments
in corporations is complicated and fact-intensive, but it
is stable and reasonably well-understood by lawyers who
can help their clients plan. Of the many things in the
Code in need of reform, the debt/equity test for corporate investments is relatively low on the list. That said,
broader debt/equity reform could be a positive development, especially if the reform reduced or eliminated
the tax differences between the two classifications. But
even in a second-best world, query whether an elective
approach would be the right reform. Despite the continuum of financial products between debt and equity,
there still seems to be something meaningfully different
between debt and equity. Or at least it is not clear that
there has ceased to be a meaningful distinction. This

makes the case for an elective classification approach
relatively weak.
Moreover, even if debt and equity are, at least within
some parameters, sufficiently interchangeable to support a
move to an elective approach, there would be many design
challenges in devising a debt/equity classification election
that would confer more policy net policy benefits than our
current classification regime. How would we draw the line
between instruments that are eligible to make the debt/
equity classification election and those that are not? What
classification status is electable and in what circumstances?
What is the default treatment if no election is made? As illustrated in this article, there are no easy answers to these (and
other) election design questions. But by working through the
analysis on these issues, this article helps to illustrate some
of the key challenges that would be faced were Congress or
the Treasury to consider broader reform that would adopt
an explicitly elective approach to debt/equity classification.
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